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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
MANSLAUGHTER BY AUTOMOBILE IN FLORIDA
Florida Statutes §§782.07, 860.01 (1949)
Increasing use of motor vehicles and the numerous deaths resulting
therefrom have resulted in a complex legal problem. The admixture
of gasoline and alcohol has intensified it. The many judicial decisions
in this field prompt a thorough consideration of the legal machinery
by which Florida has coped with the situation.
Involuntary manslaughter was a crime at common law.' It is now
generally defined and made punishable by statute.2 Enactment of
the Revised Statutes of Florida3 on June 13, 1892, abolished the four
statutory degrees of manslaughter 4 that had been in effect since
1868. 5 Prior to legislation in 19236 there was no specific Florida
statute dealing with manslaughter arising from the operation of motor
vehicles, and cases were prosecuted under the general manslaughter
act which has existed in its present form since the revision of 1892:7
"The killing of a human being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another, in cases where such killing shall not
be justifiable or excusable homicide nor murder . . . shall be
deemed manslaughter . . . ."

Manslaughter is not a degree of murder; it is a type of unlawful
homicide8 defined as felonious homicide other than murder.9 Intent,
'4 BL. COMM. "191-192.
For a comprehensive compilation of involuntary manslaughter statutes see
Moreland, A Rationale of Criminal Negligence, 32 Ky. L.J. 221, 238 et seq.
(1944).
2

3

FLA. .Ev. STAT. §2384 (1892).
Fla. Laws 1868, c. 1637, §§8-10, 11-13, 14-19, 20-21.
5
Reynolds v. State, 33 Fla. 301, 14 So. 723 (1894); Ballard v. State, 31 Fla.
266, 12 So. 865 (1893).
4

6

Fa. Laws 1923, §9269.

The present Florida statute dealing specifically with

manslaughter arising from the operation of motor vehicles is discussed below.
§2384 (1892), FA. STAT. §782.07 (1949).
SBoyett v. State, 69 Fla. 648, 68 So. 931 (1915).
9
Zow v. State, 70 Fla. 214, 70 So. 18 (1915).
7 rA. REV. STAT.

[3601
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however, is not an essential element of involuntary manslaughter, 0
and it has been supplanted by the statutory element of culpable
negligence,"' which Florida has incorporated into its manslaughter
act,' 2 as have several other states.' 8 This term has been said to be
undefinable,14 and indeed the problem of its definition has been one
of the most troublesome confronting the courts in the construction of
statutes embodying it.
CuLPABLE NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE GENERLAL MANSLAUGHiER

ACr

JudicialDefinition. In Cannon v. State15 the Florida Court adopted
the common law view' 6 accepted by most states having similar
statutes' 7 that culpable negligence must be of a higher degree than
that required to establish simple negligence upon a civil issue.' 8
Culpable negligence was said to be the equivalent of that degree of
negligence necessary to support punitive damages in civil cases negligence of
"... a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard
of human life or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous
effects; or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of indifference to consequences; or which shows such
1OKent v. State, 53 Fla. 51, 43 So. 773 (1907).
1'Hulst v. State, 123 Fla. 815, 166 So. 828 (1936).
12FLA. STAT.

§782.07 (1949).

13 K~Ax. GEN. STAT. ANN. §21-407 (1949); MIwN. STAT. ANN. §619.18 (Henderson 1949); Miss. CoDE ANN. §2220 (1942); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §4382
(1935); N.Y. PENAL LAw §1052; OWa.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §716 (1941); S.D.
CoDE §13.2016 (1939); Wis. STAT. §340.10 (1947); Wyo. Commp. STAT. ANN.

§9-205 (1945).
14
SiMs v. State, 149 Miss. 171, 115 So. 217 (1928).
1591 Fla. 214, 107.So. 860 (1926).
16
State v. Custer, 129 Kan. 381, 282 Pac. 1071 (1929) (giving good review
of the common law).
17See note 14 supra.
' 8 E.g., State v. Custer, 129 Kan. 381, 282 Pac. 1071 (1929); State v. Lester,
127 Minn. 282, 149 N. W. 297 (1914); Gregory v. State, 152 Miss. 183, 118 So.
906 (1928); State v. Millin, 318 Mo. 553, 300 S.W. 694 (1927); People v.
Meyer, 239 N.Y. 608,. 147 N.E. 216 (1925); Nail v. State, 33 OkL. Crim. 100,
242 Pac. 270 (1926); State v. Bates, 65 S.D. 105, 271 N.W. 765 (1937); State
v. McComb, 33 Wyo. 346, 239 Pac. 526 (1925). Contra: Clemens v. State, 176
Wis. 289, 185 N.W. 209 (1921).
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wantonness or recklessness or a grossly careless disregard of the
safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless indifference to
the rights of others, which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them."19
One portion of this definition indicates that the Court is not eliminating intent as an element of the crime but is merely inferring that t},c
act carries with it a presumption of intent in respect of the probable
consequences of this volitional conduct. This view accords with the
accepted premise that a crime must have the elements of both act
and intent. The definition as adopted in the Cannon case has been
followed, 20 with some slight deviation, 2 ' up to the present time.
In two subsequent cases the Court purported to apply a definition 22 which is no more stringent than that applied in tort cases to
ordinary negligence. 23 In the later of the two cases, 24 however, it
was reiterated that the Court was committed to the rule laid down in
the Cannon case that the degree of negligence required to sustain
imprisonment should be at least as high as that required for the
imposition of punitive damages in a civil action.
In Franklin v. State25 the Court reviewed an alleged error of the
trial court which defined culpable negligence in its instruction to the

jury as
...
the omission to do something which a reasonable and
prudent and cautious man would do, or the doing of something
19Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 221, 107 So. 360, 363 (1926).
20
E.g., LaViolette v. State, 159 Fla. 764, 33 So.2d 851 (1947); Walter v.
State, 157 Fla. 684, 26 So.2d 821 (1946); Savage v. State, 152 Fla. 307, 11
So.2d 778 (1943); Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 191 So. 296 (1939); Pitts v.
State, 132 Fla. 812, 182 So. 234 (1938);qFranklin v. State, 120 Fla. 686, 163
So. 55 (1935).
21
Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 191 So. 296 (1939); Austin v. State, 101 Fla.
990, 132 So. 491 (1931).
22
"Culpable negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable,
prudent and cautious man would do, or the doing of something which such a
man would not do under the circumstances surrounding the particular case,"
Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 219, 191 So. 296, 298 (1939); accord, Austin v.
State, 101 Fla. 990, 994, 132 So. 491, 493 (1931).
23
E.g., Birmingham v. Latham, 230 Ala. 601, 162 So. 675 (1935); Swilley
v. Economy Cab Co., 46 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1950).
24
Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 191 So. 296 (1939).
25120 Fla. 686, 163 So. 55 (1935).
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which such a man would not do under the circumstances sur26
rounding the particular case."'
It was held, however, that although the charge was not as full and
complete as that adopted in the Cannon case it was not such an error
in instruction as to be ground for reversal when the evidence left no
room for reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. It is undoubtedly
within the province of the appellate court to consider the sufficiency
of the evidence under a proper instruction. But whether the jury
would have found the evidence sufficient had the charge been correct
is not a question of law for the court but one of fact for the jury.
Indeed, this appears to be an unjustifiable usurpation of the jury
function in a situation in which error is patent. Gross negligence and
culpable negligence are not necessarily synonymous, though they certainly overlap. 27 Of course definitions alone are generally meaningless; it is only when they are applied to specific factual situations that
they become significant.
Application. From the basic situation in which the negligent
operation of a motor vehicle 28 has caused the death of another person, 29 there arise many varied and complex fact patterns into which
the judicial definition must be fitted if it is to be applied successfully.
Culpable negligence has been found in the operation of a vehicle at
an excessive rate of speed and without regard for other vehicles or
people. 30 Excessive speed, however, or violation of ordinances regu201d. at 689, 163 So. at 56.
27Frankin v. State, 120 Fla. 686, 689, 163 So. 55 (1935).
28
E.g., Mongeon v. State, 147 Fla. 661, 3 So.2d 371 (1941) (truck); Everett
v. State, 140 Fla. 737, 192 So. 199 (1939) (ambulance); Roland v. State, 140
Fla. 692, 192 So. 602 (1939) (automobile).
29E.g., McHugh v. State, 160 Fla. 823, 36 So.2d 786 (1948) (motor-scooter);
Hyman v. State, 152 Fla. 446, 12 So.2d 437 (1943) (motorcycle); Mongeon v.
State, 147 Fla. 661, 3 So.2d 371 (1941) (occupant of driver's vehicle); Ates v.
State, 141 Fla. 502, 194 So. 286 (1940) (bicycle); Blakes v. State, 133 Fla. 12,
182 So. 447 (1938) (pedestrian); Bannerman v. State, 125 Fla. 459, 170 So.
127 (1936) (occupant of another automobile); Hulst v. State, 123 Fla. 315,
166 So. 828 (1936) (children walking alongside street); Diehl v. State, 117 Fla.
816, 158 So. 504 (1935) (children playing near street).
30
E.g., Patterson v. State, 128 Fla. 539, 175 So. 730 (1937); Sallas v. State,
98 Fla. 464, 124 So. 27 (1929) (public beach); Denmark v. State, 88 Fla. 244,
102 So. 246 (1924) (highway); Hobbs v. State, 83 Fla. 480, 91 So. 555 (1922)
(on a street).
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lating speed, has not been a governing element in the cases, and
certainly the state is not bound to confine its proof of culpable negligence to this particular factor. 31 Nowhere does the Court rely on
speed or statutory violations as creating a presumption of culpable
negligence. Instead the more just method has been followed of giving
weight to every element of the situation to determine if the conduct
has been such as should be held criminal negligence. The burden is
on the state to prove culpable negligence; and when there is no
showing as to the cause of a fatal collision a conviction will be
32
reversed.
Culpable negligence has been found in the absence of excessive
speed when the defendant was driving at night in a dense fog 33 or
34
while in a state of stupor caused by voluntary abstinence from sleep.
Conduct which contributes toward a finding of culpable negligence
is exemplified in running a red light, 35 driving down the middle of the
highway 36 or on the left side, 37 or turning to the left in the path of
an oncoming motorcycle. 3 8 Convictions have been upheld in some
instances even though the driver wrecked his car in attempting to
avoid the accident3 9 or sounded his horn in warning which the deceased did not hear because of deafness. 40 The only explanation for
this is that the belated attempt to avoid collision does not mitigate
the driver's original culpability, which remains the proximate cause
of the death.
Convictions have been sustained in situations which hardly justify
findings of culpable negligence. In one such case the deceased was
walking at night along the edge of the street. The defendant was
driving fifteen miles per hour; his view of the deceased was blocked
31
32

Bannerman v. State, 125 Fla. 459, 170 So. 127 (1936).
Hawkins v. State, 120 Fla. 905, 163 So. 133 (1935).

A young Negro boy,

driving slowly and carefully, collided with the car of an aged white man and
was convicted of manslaughter. Justice Buford remarked that the jury must
have been influenced by something other than proof of criminal negligence.
33
Lipsey v. State, 154 Fla. 32, 16 So.2d 439 (1944).
34
Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So.2d 671 (1941).
35
Howell v. State, 136 Fla. 582, 187 So. 163 (1939).
36
37

See Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197, 197 So. 833, 837 (1940).
Franklin v. State, 120 Fla. 686, 163 So. 55 (1935)

(remanded to impose

sentence in accordance with law).
38

Hyman v. State, 152 Fla. 446, 12 So.2d 437 (1943).

39
Sallas
40

v. State, 98 Fla. 464, 124 So. 27 (1929).
Shaw v. State, 88 Fla. 320, 102 So. 550 (1924).
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by a parked car.4 1 In another case the defendant was lawfully driving
on a highway when a small child who had been picking flowers with
her parents suddenly started from one side of the road to the other
and ran into the path of the cai. 42 A finding of culpable negligence
was also affirmed in a case in which the defendant collided with an
oncoming car which suddenly turned to the left in front of the de43
fendant's car.
Two cases with similar factual situations emphasize that an act
that might be culpable if standing alone may not be when examined
with regard to all the surrounding circumstances. 44 Thus, although
violation of statutes may be some proof of negligence, the causal
connection between the violation of the statute or ordinance and the
injury or death inflicted must be established. 45 In both cases death
resulted when, in violation of two statutes, 46 a truck was left partially
on the highway at night without lights. In both instances no culpable
negligence was found, because the drivers had left undone nothing
that reasonably prudent and cautious men would have done under
the circumstances and had done nothing that reasonably prudent men
would not have done. The trucks were unavoidably disabled and
everything possible was done to restore them to operating condition.
In one case 4r the driver had stationed a boy in the road to flag
rapidly approaching cars.
Evidence has been held insufficient to establish culpable negligence
in a number of cases that do not easily fall under any generalization.
Thus when the deceased, while crossing a highway near which she
had lived for many years, was struck by a motorist driving on the
proper side, the driver was absolved of blame because the deceased
was aware of the heavy traffic at that point at all times, the driver
had a lawful right to travel there, and the deceased when crossing the
highway was charged with the duty to exercise due care. 48 In a
41 ee Hulst v. State, 123 Fla. 315, 319, 166 So. 828, 830 (1936).
42
Laster v. State, 160 Fla. 158, 33 So.2d 728 (1948).
43
Williams v. State, 147 Fla. 91, 2 So.2d 801 (1941).
44
Thompson v. State, 108 Fla. 370, 146 So. 201 (1933); Austin v. State, 101
Fla. 990, 132 So. 491 (1931).

451bid.
46

FLA. CoMI'. GmE. LAws §1294 (1927) (motor vehicles to be provided with
lights, etc.); §1320 (stopping car on road).
47Thompson v. State, 108 Fla. 370, 146 So. 201 (1933).
48
Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 191 So. 296 (1939). But cf. Sallas v. State,
98 Fla. 464, 124 So. 27 (1929).
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situation in which the defendant was meeting two approaching cars,
the second of which, in passing the first, struck defendant's car, knocking off its left front wheel and causing it to swerve into the car being
passed, the Supreme Court reversed, on rehearing, a finding of culpable negligence. 4 9 Losing control of a car by momentarily taking
one's eyes off the road, causing it to plunge into a canal alongside
and resulting in the death of an occupant, has been held not to constitute culpable negligence. 50 Nor does criminal liability attach when
circumstances beyond the control of the accused cause him against
his will to be in a situation that results in another's death. 51
Regardless of the apparent lack of justification of some decisions,
the Florida Court has recognized that weight should be given to
mitigating incidents and that the final result depends upon a careful
balancing of all the circumstances of the individual case.
MANSLAUGHTER UNDER THE INTOXICATION STATUTE

Death in an accident occurring when the driver of the offending
vehicle is intoxicated is apparently regarded by the Legislature as so
serious that, by statute, proof of culpable negligence in such situations
is unnecessary to sustain a conviction of manslaughter. The first
legislative enactment concerning driving while intoxicated was passed
in 1915.52 That act made it a misdemeanor for any person to operate
an automobile while intoxicated. It was amended in 1923 by providing a greater penalty for the misdemeanor if damage to property
result and adding that if death result the driver shall be guilty of
manslaughter. 53 The additional manslaughter provision was restricted
to driving while intoxicated, while the misdemeanor portion embraced
both driving while under the influence of intoxicants and while in an
intoxicated condition. The statute has continued in substantially this
54
form to the present.
49

See Graives v. State, 127 Fla. 182, 188, 172 So. 716, 718 (1936). But the
conviction was upheld on count under intoxication statute. The Court said if
drivers of two cars were both guilty of criminal negligence causing the death of
an innocent third driver, it would be no defense to either that the other contributed to causing the result.
5
OSavage v. State, 152 Fla. 367, 11 So.2d 778 (1948).
51
Pitts v. State, 132 Fla. 812, 182 So. 234 (1938) semble.
52
Fla. Laws 1915, c. 6882.
53
Fla. Laws 1923, c. 9269.
54
FLA. STAT. §860.01 (1949):
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This statute has been held to create a separate offense, of which
culpable negligence is not a specific element and need not be alleged. 5
The offense is not in driving negligently while intoxicated but in the
killing of a person by driving while intoxicated.5 6 A possible theory
of legislative intent is that it is considered criminal negligence for a
person in an intoxicated condition to attempt to drive, and if death
results such initial negligence will be imputed to the act itself.57 The
Supreme Court voiced this theory in a recent decision. 58 Even though
manslaughter caused by drunken driving can be prosecuted under
either the general statute or the intoxication statute, the offenses are
distinct and prosecution for one offense will not bar prosecution for
the other.50
The manslaughter portion of the intoxication statute uses the words
while intoxicated to the exclusion of the words under the influence of
intoxicants, and it has been held that these phrases are not synonymous. Thus, a charge that the defendant was under the influence of
intoxicants is insufficient to indict properly for manslaughter under the
intoxication statute. 60 Although anyone intoxicated is under the in"It is unlawful for any person, while in an intoxicated condition or under
the influence of intoxicating liquor to such extent as to deprive him of full
possession of his normal faculties, to drive or operate over the highways or
streets or thoroughfares of Florida, any automobile, truck .... Any person convicted of violation of this section shall be punished as provided by §317.20.
"If, however, damage to property or person of another, other than damage
resulting in death of any person, is done by said intoxicated person under the
influence of intoxicating liquor to such extent as to deprive him of full possession
of his normal faculties, by reason of the operation of any of said vehicles mentioned herein, he shall" upon conviction be fined not more than five hundred
dollars, and also be imprisoned not less than three months nor more than
twelve months, and if the death of any human being be caused by the operation
of a motor vehicle by any person while intoxicated, such person shall be deemed
guilty of manslaughter, and on conviction be punished as provided by existing
law relating to manslaughter."
The constitutionality of this statute was upheld as against the contention
that the title embraces more than one subject, Roddenberry v. State, 152 Fla.
197, 11 So.2d 582 (1942).
5STootle v. State, 100 Fla. 1248, 130 So. 912 (1930).
56See Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 218, 107 So. 360, 362 (1926).

57bid.
5SRoddenberry v. State, 152 Fla. 197, 11 So.2d 582 (1942).
5
PAccord, McHugh v. State, 160 Fla. 823, 36 So.2d 786 (1948).
6
0OCannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360 (1926). Contra: Whitman v.
State, 97 Fla. 988, 122 So. 567 (1929).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1951], Art. 4

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
fluence of intoxicants, the reverse is not always true. A person who
has partaken of an intoxicant to any extent may be under its influence,
but it is when this influence is of such a degree as to deprive him of full
possession of his normal faculties that he can properly be said to be
intoxicated. In one case, 61 however, a conviction under the intoxication statute was sustained although the defendant, arrested shortly
after the accident, drove through the traffic of the streets of Pensacola
to the jail under the direction of the arresting officer, who rode in the
car with him. Justice Buford, in his dissent, thought that this fell far
short of showing that he was under the influence of intoxicants to
such an extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal
62
faculties.
If the words under the influence of intoxicants are included in an
indictment framed under the general manslaughter statute, they will
be treated as surplusage. 63 Testimony as to defendant's intoxication,
however, is admissible to establish culpable negligence, on the theory
that ordinarily persons merely under the influence of intoxicants are
more apt to be reckless and daring.6 4 Intoxication is not an essential
ingredient of manslaughter under the general act, but may be an
element of culpable negligence.6 5 The misdemeanor of driving while
under the influence of intoxicants is somewhat duplicated by another
6 7
statute, 66 but a conviction under it and a reckless driving statute
does not operate to bar subsequent prosecution under the general
manslaughter statute 68 or under the manslaughter provision of the
intoxication statute.6 9 Furthermore, if indicted under both the general
act and the intoxication statute and acquitted of culpable negligence,
conviction can nevertheless be sustained under the intoxication
statute.7 0 The fact that all allegations essential to charge man61

Ates v. State, 141 Fla. 502, 194 So. 286 (1940).

621d. at 505, 194 So. at 287.
63

Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360 (1926).
64Ibid.
65
See Hobbs v. State, 83 Fla. 480, 482, 91 So. 555, 556 (1922).
6
6FL.. STAT. §317.20 (1949): "It is unlawful... for any person who is ...
under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . when affected to the extent that
his or her normal faculties are impaired, to drive or be in the actual physical

control of any vehicle within this state."
67
F.A. STAT. §317.21 (1949).
68
State
69

70

v. Bacom, 159 Fla. 54, 30 So.2d 744 (1947).
Bacom v. State, 39 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1949).

Ates v. State, 141 Fla. 502, 194 So. 286 (1940); Graives v. State, 127
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slaughter under either statute are contained in one count does not
make the indictment invalid for duplicity. 71 In a case in which the
defendant driver killed two newsboys who were riding on a motor
scooter, acquittal under the general manslaughter statute for the
death of one boy did not bar a subsequent prosecution for the death
72
of the other under the intoxication statute.
CONCLUSION

The general manslaughter statute defines manslaughter only in a
negative manner by pointing out what homicides are not manslaughter, and fails to include any of the elements that distinguish
manslaughter from other homicides. The general terms of the statute
are sufficiently broad to cover all homicides that should reasonably
be included. A fairly well-settled body of law resulting from judicial
interpretation is based upon the theory that manslaughter resulting
from driving in a culpably negligent manner is included within the
broad terms of the statute. Another separate offense exists, namely,
manslaughter resulting from driving while intoxicated. The intoxication statute is a valuable adjunct to legislation dealing with manslaughter because it substitutes the factual question of whether the
defendant was driving while intoxicated for the nebulous abstraction
of culpable negligence. Stringent penalties are thus provided for
driving while intoxicated, apparently on the theory that this will deter
drunkenness on the highways. The type of statute in effect in Florida
is not the only solution to the problem.73 Only a careful study could
prove whether the Florida policy actually deters driving while intoxicated to a greater degree than the rule that intoxication merely raises
a presumption of culpable negligence.
WALTER T. EmCKSON

Fla. 182, 172 So. 716 (1936); Barrington v. State, 145 Fla. 61, 199 So. 320
(1940).
71 Kay v. State, 114 Fla. 44, 153 So. 311 (1934).
72MCHugh v. State, 160 Fla. 823, 36 So.2d 786 (1948).
7
8E.g., MicH. Coie. LAws §17115-324-5 (Mason Cum. Supp. 1940); Omo
GEm. CODE ANN. §§12404, 12404-1 (Page 1938); N.H. REV. LAws c. 118, §12
(1942); VT. REv. STAT. §10,286 (1947). For a discussion of the Law of states having statutes of this nature see Riesenfeld, Negligent Homikide-A Study in Statutory

Interpretation,25 CAw. L. REV. 1 (1936); Note, 41 J. Cmii. L. & CmnNoLory
183 (1950).
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